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The Price of Anarchy in Urban Traffic 
Networks 
 
Transportation networks and the flows of people and goods through them have naturally attracted the 
attention of mathematicians, at least as far back as Euler’s elegant representation of urban connectivity in 
Königsberg as a link-node graph. In the notorious travelling salesman problem, the graph representing the 
transport network has links with explicit lengths to capture not only the connectivity, but also the distance 
travelled . This is also the case in ‘the transportation problem’ (to minimise the total transport cost when 
supplying  factories from  coal mines) where flows arise from multiple sources and sinks. However, a 
network model that is useful for managing urban traffic requires additional attributes to be included in terms 
of demand, supply and traveller behaviour. 
 
Unlike the coal in the transportation problem, individuals are keen to arrive at their own particular desired 
destination; traffic flows are not freely interchangeable between sources and sinks. Trips are associated with 
specific origin → destination node pairs and the volumes of trips (demand flows) are collected in the origin-
destination (OD) matrix.  Regarding supply: one of the primary motivations for developing traffic network 
models is to manage congestion, and so it is essential to represent the fact that link capacities are finite. The 
relationship between traffic flow on a link and link travel time is captured by a link cost function1. Finally we 
recognise that travellers do not simply choose the shortest geometric path, they seek alternative routes to 
avoid congestion and minimise delays. Modelling the more nuanced aspects of route choice is a substantial 
area of research. Perhaps the most natural principle for assigning OD flows to possible routes was set out by 
John Wardrop (1952): 
Travellers choose routes such that they each, selfishly, minimise their individual travel time: this is the User 
Equilibrium (UE) principle. 
This feedback mechanism between congestion and route-choice leads to an equilibrium, albeit under several 
assumptions. In 1956 Beckman et al. set out a convenient minimization formulation to solve the UE model 
and determine its equilibrium link flows, and hence large traffic network equilibrium problems could be 
solved numerically, at least in principle. Once PCs became widely available, the UE model started to be used 
‘in anger’, to model traffic flows in real city networks, and to forecast the consequences of different possible 
traffic management and network investment schemes. 
 
The assumptions underlying UE are rather strong: demand and supply are both fixed, travellers are perfectly 
informed and diligently cost-minimizing, and the traffic flows attain a static equilibrium! These are not quite 
representative of typical experiences in urban traffic. Since the fifties, researchers have been busy developing 
more sophisticated representations of demand, supply and route-choice behaviour, in particular introducing 
time dependency and stochasticity into all of these elements. Despite such advances, and regardless of its 
assumptions and irksome analytic properties, the UE model became firmly established as the most practically 
useful and robust methodology for urban traffic network analysis, and continues to be used today for traffic 
management and planning all around the world.  
 
It is notable that the UE model specification ignores network efficiency, indeed it is well known that typically 
UE flows do not minimise the total network travel cost. Under UE travellers seek to minimise their own OD 
travel time, but they do not suffer the additional congestion they add to the system. Consequently, delays 
                                                            
1 Or link travel time function, link impedance function. Travel time and cost will be used synonymously. 
due to congestion might be improved by rerouting flows, without having to reduce demand or invest in 
additional network capacity. In fact Wardrop noted an alternative routing principle: 
Travellers each, unselfishly, choose routes such that the total travel time in the network when aggregated 
across all travellers is minimised: the System Optimal (SO) principle. 
 
An obvious questions arises: how much could congestion be improved by rerouting the traffic? 
 
Consider a traffic network comprising two nodes joined by 2 parallel links with link flows  = 	,  . The 
single OD pair has demand flow  = 1, and the link cost functions are 		 = 	,   = 1. 
Following Wardrop, each selfish, cost-minimizing traveller will use link 1 giving user equilibrium flows  =1,0  with total travel  cost  = ∑  = 1 . The SO solution in this case happens to be   =1 2⁄ , 1 2⁄  which reduces the total system cost to  = ∑  = 3/4 .  
 
The extent of the inefficiency of selfish routing can be quantified by the Price of Anarchy: the ratio of the 
total network travel cost under UE to the total network travel cost under SO: 
! =  =
∑  ∀#∈%∑ ∀#∈%  
Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) demonstrated an upper bound of 4 3⁄  for the PoA in traffic networks with 
affine link cost functions; as illustrated by the two-link example above. Upper bounds for the PoA have been 
derived for other (nonlinear) link cost function specifications wherein the PoA can be much higher than 4/3. 
The two link example above with the simple modification: 		 = 	&,  = 1 can be used to illustrate 
that the PoA upper bound increases with ∋. 
 
The PoA has appeal as an indicator for policy makers. Bounds on the PoA conveniently set out the maximum 
possible congestion improvement attainable by rerouting flows. However, not only are the theoretical 
bounds rarely witnessed in models of real urban networks, but the PoA depends on both the magnitude and 
configuration of OD demands. Since the OD matrix changes within the day and from day-to-day in a real 
network, which OD matrix should be used to compute a representative value for the PoA? Moreover, how 
can we ensure efforts to reroute traffic in order to attain SO flows are focussed on being effective when the 
OD travel demands offer the greatest gains? 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the PoA changes as travel demand is increased, for three different networks each of 
which are discussed in more detail below.  
A B C 
Figure 1 – Price of Anarchy against Demand for three networks 
The 5-parallel links network (A) is an extract from Figure 2; the 5-link network (B) is shown in Figure 3; and 
the Sioux Falls network (C) is shown in Figure 5. In each plot, it is notable that the PoA is well below the 
theoretical bound2, plus there are some complex and interesting ﬂuctuations in the PoA as a function of 
demand.Price of anarchy versus demand plots, for network models based on areas of Boston, New York and 
London, can be found in Youn et al. [4] and they display these same characteristics.  
The inﬂuence of network topology (in terms of both connectivity and link capacities) on network eﬃciency 
and the PoA is an area of ongoing research not only in transport but more widely in network science. Here 
we focus on some speciﬁc features of these PoA plots. For each network, there is an initial region in which 
the PoA is unity; an intermediate region of ﬂuctuations; and a ﬁnal region of decay. It is also appears that 
PoA is non-smooth as a function of demand. What gives rise to these features? 
As demand increases the set of active routes expands 
Consider a traffic network of  parallel links, serving a single OD pair with demand  > 0, and with link cost 
functions of the form  = ) + +, where ) , + > 0 and ) < )−	 ∀/ = 1, … , . The “free flow” travel 
time (given by link length in this case) is ) and we label the links in order of increasing length. At sufficiently 
low levels of demand , the UE solution has flow only on the quickest/shortest route, link 1. Under the UE 
routing principle the cost on link 1 is not greater than on any other link. 
		 =  ≤  = 0  ⟺  )	 + +	 ≤ )  ⟺  ≤ ) − )	+	  
As demand increases and  > ) − )	 +	⁄ , link 2 activates and, following UE, 		 =  . Both 
links carry flow and the set of minimum cost routes, 456, comprises links 1 and 2. As demand increases, 
OD travel cost increases and further links activate in turn. This process continues until, at a sufficiently large 
level of demand, the set of minimum cost routes includes all links.  
 
Under SO a similar pattern occurs: increasing demand causes a sequence of links to be added to the set of 
used routes. As an aside, it is helpful to know the general result that for a network with link costs , SO flows 
would arise if UE-like travellers were to selfishly minimize their travel costs according to the modified link 
costs: ̃ =  +  8 8⁄ . For the above parallel link network the cost transformation ̃  yields 
 ̃ =  + 88  = ) + + + + = ) + 2+ (1)   
The pattern of changes in the set of minimum marginal total cost routes under SO, 4956, can therefore be 
obtained by redefining +: = 2+ from the UE case. As demand increases, the order in which routes activate 
is the same under UE and SO.  
Consider a sequence of networks with number of links  = 2,3, … ,10 and coefficients ) = /, + = 1 for / = 1, … ,10. Figure 2 shows the Price of Anarchy !; for each of these nine networks. Vertical lines mark 
the link activations under UE (green) and SO (red). 
                                                            
2 A and B have linear cost functions so the theoretical upper bound for PoA is 4/3. Network C has 4th power costs 
hence the theoretical upper bound is 2.15 (see Roughgarden 2003) 
 
Figure 2 - The Variation of the Price of Anarchy against Demand in < = =, … , >? Parallel Link Network 
For levels of demand  up to the first route transition point under SO, the Price of Anarchy is 1. Beyond this 
for each , levels of demand at which 456 expands coincide with levels of demand at which the PoA is non-
differentiable. There is a decrease in the gradient of the PoA at each of these points. In contrast the PoA is 
differentiable at all levels of demand at which there is an expansion in the SO active route set, 4956. For each  = 2, … ,10, the graphs of !;≅	 and !; depart from one another at each of these points. 
Expansions in the UE active route set lead to decreases in the PoA whereas expansions in the SO active route 
set lead to increases in the PoA. As demand increases beyond the last route transition point, the PoA begins 
to decay back towards unity as Α1 ⁄ .  
Under increasing demand the active route-set can contract  
It is perhaps less intuitive that routes and links may also deactivate under increasing demand. The following 
is the simplest illustration we came across. Consider the traﬃc network shown in Fig. 3, which serves two OD 
pairs O → D1 and O → D2 with link cost functions: 	 = 2 + 	,  = 3 + , Β = 9 + Β, D = 1 + D and Ε = 1 + Ε. There are two routes for each OD pair: for O → D1, the routes are link {1} and links {2, 4}; for O 
→ D2, the routes are links {2, 5} and link {3}. 
 
Figure 3 - Five Link Network with Two OD Pairs 
Demand →Φ = 1 is fixed while →Φ	 increases from zero. Figure 4 shows the active routes under SO via 
the variation of marginal total route costs. For  → Φ	  <  11.5, route {2, 5} is active (part of the minimum 
marginal total cost route set for O → D2) but not for demand  → Φ	 >  11.5. For this network the pattern 
of expansions and contractions under UE is the same, although at different levels of demand. 
  
Figure 4 - Route Costs under SO against increasing demand on O->D1  
As demand increases on the single OD, the PoA gradient decreases at expansions and increases at 
contractions in the UE route-set, 456Ι . Under SO, points of expansion/contraction in the SO route-set, 4956Ι  
correspond to an increase/decrease in the PoA gradient. 
The PoA in Larger Networks  
How do these simple examples inform patterns seen in general networks with many links, nodes and multiple 
OD movements? Overall, as demand increases new routes will activate. However, establishing proofs for 
what happens at every route-set transition point involves dealing with possibly complex scenarios; an 
expansion in the minimum cost route set for one OD movement could coincide with a contraction in the 
minimum cost route set for a different OD movement. It is also exactly at changes to the active route-set that 
the problem of existence/non-existence of (directional) derivatives arises. This is a thorny issue in the 
sensitivity analysis of UE and makes the analysis rather arduous. 
In O’Hare et al (2016) we identify and describe the effects of four mechanisms that govern the variation of 
the PoA. When the SO route-set expands/contracts, the PoA ‘kicks’ up/down (that is to say the PoA gradient 
increases/decreases when compared with no route-set expansion/contraction being allowed). When the UE 
route-set expands/contracts the PoA ‘kicks’ down/up. 
In the special case of traffic networks with cost functions of the form  = ) + +ϑ, for which ) , + , Κ > 0, 
it turns out to be surprisingly simple to derive a systematic relationship between the UE and SO link flows,  Λ and Λ, as functions of the OD demand Λ.  
  Μ ΛΝΚ + 1Ο Π =
1
ΝΚ + 1Ο  Λ (2)   
A similar relationship between the UE and SO route-set transition points follows from this. For networks with 
this simple form of cost functions we observed the leading order behaviour of the PoA as it decays back to 
unity is Α∀1 Θϑ⁄ #, where Θ is a global demand multiplier applied to the demand matrix3. 
A Network with Multiple ODs 
The canonical test network of Sioux Falls4 comprises 24 nodes and 76 links. The cost of travel   on each link 
has cost function of the form  = ) + +D () , + > 0. Demand is increased simultaneously on five of the 
OD pairs, via the same demand multiplier, ΘΡ , for each OD movement.  Figure 5 shows how the PoA fluctuates 
with demand, active route set changes are labelled as before.  
 
Figure 5 – The Variation of the Price of Anarchy against the Demand Multiplier 
The PoA profile comprises many changes to the set of active routes, both expansions and contractions, whose 
details follow the descriptions in O’Hare et al (2016). Despite capturing these details, we still do not have an 
efficient practical method for estimating the maximum PoA for a given network across a range of OD 
demands. PoA bounds are provided by Roughgarden (2003) for different classes of link cost functions, but 
consider what is the worst possible network giving the maximum PoA, and show this is attained in simple 
networks. Consequently, in a large network a deliberately minimal OD matrix might be used to effectively 
limit all link flows to a two-link subnetwork in order to maximise PoA, but this does not satisfactorily address 
the practical issue of interest: when is PoA maximised within a plausible ensemble of OD matrices? 
The influence of topology on the PoA (and hence on network efficiency) for urban road transport remains a 
substantial area for further research, needing understanding of both the supply-side network infrastructure 
and the demand configuration, and their interaction. One possible conclusion is that the PoA is rather 
problematic as an indicator in practical terms; the magnitude and configuration of demand can change 
                                                            
3 See arXiv:1605.03081 on asymptotics of PoA 
4 This small city in North Dakota appeared as an example in a 1973 paper on network design. Subsequent papers used 
this precedent for comparison, and Sioux Falls became established as a standard test network. For test details see 
O’Hare at al 2016. 
rapidly, both within the day but also structurally from year to year. Any policy intended to improve network 
efficiency by rerouting traffic needs to take account of these fluctuations and ensure its impact coincides 
with the demand configurations that offer the greatest gains. 
However, we can also allow ourselves the pleasure of finding something interesting, regardless of whether 
or not it has any obvious practical use. Understanding that links (and routes) can switch ‘off’ as well as ‘on’ is 
perhaps not surprising after a few moments’ thought. In subsequent tests we came across networks with 
more complex link switching: a link that started ‘off’, switched ‘on’, switched ‘off’ and switched ‘on’ again, all 
due to increasing demand on a single OD. Figure 3 shows the simplest network we could find to illustrate 
contraction of the active route set and a link switching ‘off’. Perhaps is it interesting to imagine how to 
construct the simplest network that would give an arbitrarily long sequence of on/off switches for some link? 
References 
BECKMANN M.J., McGUIRE C.B. & WINSTEN C.B. (1956). Studies in the Economics of Transportation. Yale 
University Press. 
O’HARE, S.J., CONNORS, R.D., WATLING, D.P. 2016 . Mechanisms that govern how the Price of Anarchy 
varies with travel demand. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 84, 55-80. 
ROUGHGARDEN, T. 2003. The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. Journal of 
Computer and System Sciences, 67, 341-364. 
ROUGHGARDEN, T. & TARDOS, E. 2002. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the Acm, 49, 236-259. 
WARDROP, J. G. Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research.  Proceedings of the Institute of Civil 
Engineers, Pt II, 1952. 325-378. 
YOUN, H., GASTNER, M. T. & JEONG, H. 2008. Price of anarchy in transportation networks: Efficiency and 
optimality control. Physical Review Letters, 101. 
 
